A UN probe of Burma - what's in everyone's best interest?

In todays' Washington Post, David Steinberg of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service argues that the US should not support the the creation of a UN commission of inquiry into the Burmese military regime's crimes against humanity and war crimes. He notes that such commissions, along with war crimes trials, sanctions, and embargoes, are popular tools for nations to 'express moral outrage' and can lead to positive outcomes, such as liberalization, increased human rights, or even regime change. But in his opinion, things are starting to look up in Burma, and we may be beginning to see 'the transformation of a "soft authoritarian" state into one that is more pluralistic'. Thus, to quote Steinberg in full,

imposing additional sanctions on Burma's regime or forming still more commissions will only salve our consciences. Neither will help the Burmese people, persuade the government to loosen its grip on the population, or even assist the United States in meeting its strategic or humanitarian objectives. In fact, such moves would hinder negotiations and relations with a new government that, even if far from a model for governance, would probably give the Burmese more political voice and freedom than they have had in half a century. If our concerns are for the well-being of the people and U.S. national interests in the region, then we might well wait for the elections and whatever government comes into power. Then will be the time to judge whether there has been a step forward and how to achieve our goals.

So in Steinberg's opinion, supporting a commission would undermine the slight cracks that may or may not be appearing in the Burmese military's grip on power. This is basically a 'wait and see' position, and a trade-off approach to the problem - let's put justice on the back burner until we can get the country in a more stable, favorable position internationally. We have to prioritize and avoid jeopardizing the ultimate goal of regime liberalization for the sake of immediate moral imperatives. But what if Steinberg is wrong? What if the slight 'indicators' of progress he notes are not sustainable, and the 'new' Burmese government is no more vulnerable to Western ideals or influence than the current one? What does it mean for the US to sacrifice a moral opportunity for a realpolitik calculation that is extremely risky at best?

In fact, there are arguments that it is indeed in the US national interest to take the moral high road here, and that a justice-first policy may actually be a better interpretation of realpolitik. An editorial in yesterday's Washington Post took exactly the opposite position from Steinberg's, recalling President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech in which he stated that 'when there is genocide in Darfur, systematic rape in Congo, or repression in Burma, there must be consequences'. The piece argues that 'backing a UN commission does not supplant previous US policy' and does not preclude continued pragmatic engagement. What it does, however, is signal to younger officers that hitching their futures to policies of mass killing may not be the best idea, as well as to other offensive dictators around the world that they cannot get away with behavior like Than Shwen's. Moreover, and in my opinion every bit as important as the potential deterrent effect of a commission (and of proving that Obama's got follow-through), US backing can 'provide a ray of hope and moral support to the unimaginably brave fighters for democracy inside Burma'. I think we can take this statement even further, and say that such a 'ray of hope' will extend beyond Burma's democratic activists and touch other oppressed peoples.

If it's not already clear, I'm in the editorial's camp, and not in Steinberg's....